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MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERALISM
Colin McGrath
During the 2008 financial crisis, general municipalities' across the
United States began considering bankruptcy as a means for resolving
systemic budget crises. This signified a substantial shift in the rela-
tionship between municipalities and Chapter 9 of the federal bank-
ruptcy code. Until 2008, few general municipalities filed under
Chapter 9. Special utility districts filed most Chapter 9 petitions.
During the recession following 2008, decreases in property value
drained municipal tax revenue. Meanwhile, cities and counties main-
tained spending levels to meet contractual obligations and maintain
basic services. General municipalities in the United States faced ac-
cumulating debt and the threat of budget deficits. Some used Chap-
ter 9 debt adjustment in attempts to resolve structural budget crises.
These events culminated in Detroit, Michigan, filing under Chapter 9
in 2013 for the largest debt adjustment in the nation's history. De-
troit exited bankruptcy on December 10, 2014.
As general municipalities began filing Chapter 9 petitions, bank-
ruptcy scholars noted that the municipal bankruptcy code did little to
address systemic problems underlying fiscal distress. Two key pro-
posals emerged from academic debate. The first contended that
bankruptcy judges should use key points of leverage during bank-
ruptcy proceedings to impose tax increases or spending reductions
on municipalities. The second argued that judges should impose a
restructuring of municipal governance to remedy governmental defi-
ciencies that enable poor fiscal management.
These proposals raise substantial constitutional concerns. Doc-
trines of federalism, which broadly aim to preserve the dignity and
autonomy of states and their political subdivisions, threaten to limit
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1 The term "general municipality" describes governmental jurisdictions like counties, cities,
and towns. The bankruptcy code defines municipality more broadly to mean a "political
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State," 11 U.S.C. 101(40) (2005),
which encompasses an entity like a utility district or public authority.
2 Monica Davey, Detroit Out of Bankruptcy But Not Out of the Woods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014,
at A21, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/1 /us/detroit-bankruptcy-ending.html.
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the reach of proactive bankruptcy courts. The judicial imposition of
tax increases and governance restructuring would allow federal pow-
er to reach core elements of local self-rule. But as this Comment con-
tends, such imposition stands as a crucial amendment o current mu-
nicipal bankruptcy practices.
Part I.A. of this Comment examines the heightened role munici-
pal bankruptcy has played in aiding cities and counties in resolving
debt crises in recent years. Part I.B. analyzes strategies that bankrupt-
cy judges may pursue to better assist distressed municipalities in se-
curing a "fresh start." Part II of this Comment analyzes the constitu-
tional viability of judicial and legislative actions that would
reformulate Chapter 9 as a viable tool for assisting fiscal crises. Part
II.A. dissects theories motivating three of the Supreme Court's core
doctrines of federalism-commandeering, coercion, and comity-to
assess the force with which they circumscribe the reach of federal
bankruptcy courts. The part concludes that each doctrine has analyt-
ical instabilities that suggest bankruptcy courts may intervene in local
taxation and governance.
Part II.B. proposes a more fundamental rethinking of the rela-
tionship between federalism and the Constitution's Bankruptcy
Clause. The Supreme Court's recent decisions limiting the reach of
state Eleventh Amendment immunity, as asserted during in rem pro-
ceedings, suggests that the Bankruptcy Clause contemplates a deroga-
tion of state autonomy. Principles of federalism should not apply in
bankruptcy proceedings as they do to other positive grants of authori-
ty such as the Commerce Clause. This Comment argues that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz'
has implications beyond the Eleventh Amendment. Part II.B. thus
argues that bankruptcy judges may not only require tax adjustments
and governance structuring as a condition of Chapter 9 eligibility or
confirmation. Judges may order these reconfigurations as means
necessary for ensuring sound resolution of a municipality's fiscal dis-
4
tress.
I. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY
Congress passed the nation's first municipal bankruptcy code in
1934.' Since the 1930s, the composition of municipal budgets and
3 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
4 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
5 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 524 (1936).
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the nature of municipal finance practices underwent transformations
that rendered Chapter 9 an inadequate tool for regulating the debt
of general municipalities. In the late 1970s and 1980s, local revenue
collapsed as the federal government withdrew grants to local gov-
ernments.' The proliferation of tax revolts across the United States
during the same period further depressed local governments' access
to operating funds. In response to lost revenue, over the last three
decades local governments became increasingly reliant on debt to fi-
nance their operations. In 1945, local and state outstanding munici-
pal security and loan liability stood at $12 billion, or $146 billion in
current dollars. Liability rose to over $2.9 trillion in 2014.9 In a mu-
nicipality like the City of Philadelphia, outstanding general obligation
debt exceeds annual tax revenue.'o In addition to relying on general
6 See, e.g., ROGER BILES, THE FATES OF CITIES: URBAN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, 1945-2000 267 (2011) (explaining that the Reagan Administration cut
funding for housing programs more than funding to any other area of the federal budg-
et, with funding cut to two-thirds of its 1981 level by 1987, and budget authority for the
Community Development Block Grant cut from $3.7 billion to $3.1 billion in the same
period). The administration also cut funding for transportation by 10% in 1986 and an
additional 2.5% the next year. Id. During this period, the administration required the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to reduce expenditures
for assisted housing by 85% and Community Development Block Grant outlays by 29%.
Id. at 278.
7 See generally ROBERT 0. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR
OAKLAND 325-26 (2003) (explaining that in 1979, the year after California passed Propo-
sition 13, over twenty additional states enacted "tax reform legislation" and over twenty
states also passed laws reducing income tax). Proposition 13 established limits on real
property taxation and required a two-thirds vote from the legislature to raise any tax. Id.
at 321.
8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), State and Local Governments, Ex-
cluding Employee Retirement Funds; Municipal Securities and Loans; Liability, Lev-
el [SLGMSOAO27N], retrieved from FRED, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://research.stionisfed.org/fred2/series/SLGMSOA027N/ (last visited Mar. 26,
2015). Inflation calculated using the Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator. CPI In-
flation Calculator, http://data.bis.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
9 Id. Most liability across this period consisted of long-term obligations. See Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (US), State and Local Governments, Excluding Employee
Retirement Funds; Municipal Securities and Loans; Liability, Level [SLGSECQ027S], retrieved
from FRED, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/SLGSECQ027S/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015)
(reporting long-term liability in 2014 of $2.8 trillion and in 1945 of $11.8 million in 1946
dollars).
10 See CIY OF PHILADELPHIA, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
ENDEDJUNE 30, 2014 23, 31 (2014) (reporting outstanding total long-term debt of $8.8
billion and tax revenue of $3.37 billion). In 2014, Philadelphia's expenditures exceeded
all revenue by $335 million. Id. at 31. See also CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2006 (2006) (reporting out-
standing total long-term debt of $7.4 billion and tax revenue of $2.7 billion).
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obligation and revenue bonds," municipalities began experimenting
with novel financing techniques like Tax Increment Financing," in-
vestment in high-risk securities,' and other novel debt-financing
methods.4 Debt plays a central role in supporting redevelopment ef-
forts and the ongoing functions of municipalities, placing cities and
counties at risk of insolvency. The 2008 financial crisis revealed the
extent of this risk.
The bankruptcy code aims to provide insolvent debtors a fresh
start. But Chapter 9 also serves as a regulatory apparatus. Chapter
9's protections allow municipalities to assume the risk that accompa-
nies massive debt. When a municipality's debt hits a critical level,
Chapter 9 offers a tool allowing the municipality to restore its func-
tions. Chapter 9 governs the necessary allocation of loss.
A bankruptcy code reflects normative judgments regarding who
should bear the cost of debt." In the context of municipal bankrupt-
cy, loss must be allocated among pensioners, institutional investors,
corporate creditors, private creditors, taxpayers, and the municipality
itself. As this part argues, Chapter 9 largely shifts the cost of munici-
pal risk-taking to creditors, without requiring municipalities to inter-
nalize the cost of unsound fiscal judgment. In so doing, Chapter 9
fails to stabilize the finances of a distressed municipality. It provides a
temporary solution to fiscal distress without resolving structural defi-
ciencies that brought the municipality before a bankruptcy court.
Judicial intervention in municipal functions during bankruptcy pro-
11 See generally GAIL RADFORD, THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY: STATEBUILDING AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURYAMERICA 5 (2013) (discussing increases
in general obligation and revenue debt).
12 See generally Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Politi-
cal Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 69-70 (2010) ("The double wham-
my of the withdrawal of federal urban development aid funds beginning in the Nixon
administration and the adoption of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 and comparable
tax and expenditure limitations in other states soon after led to a rapid and dramatic in-
crease in the use of TIF.").
13 See, e.g., In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 598 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing the
County's investment in "inverse floaters," a volatile type of derivative that based its value
on a reference to the London Interbank Offer Rate).
14 See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal Competi-
lion for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt, Pension and OBEP
Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 686-87 (2014) (discussing
the use of "complex, non-traditional instruments such as variable rate demand obliga-
tions ("VRDO"), auction rate securities, and interest rate swaps . . . .").
15 See, e.g., MANN, infra note 256, at 83 (quoting a 1754 pamphlet criticizing imprisonment
of debtors, which asked whether "it is best for Society, that his Creditors receive a Propor-
tion of their Debts ... and his Person be sat at Liberty to seek new Employment; or that
his Body be imprisoned for the Deficiency, until he pays the utmost Farthing, which is
impossible?").
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ceedings may balance the allocation of risk. It may also prove neces-
sary for repairing broken elements of a municipality's governance
practices or fiscal policy that caused a debt burden to become crip-
pling. With debt now a central component to municipal operations,
bankruptcy courts must ensure that the cost of debt does not fall dis-
proportionately on a municipality's most vulnerable stakeholders.
A. The Shifting Landscape of Municipal Bankruptcy
The U.S. Congress enacted the nation's modern bankruptcy code
in 1978. Under Chapter 9 of the code, titled "Adjustment of Debts
of a Municipality," a municipality may file a petition with a federal
bankruptcy court, which automatically places a stay on the enforce-
ment of claims against a debtor municipality.7 The municipality re-
tains sole power to submit a plan for the adjustment of its debts."'
Once the bankruptcy court confirms the filed plan, the municipality
frees itself of all debts that the plan does not except from discharge.'9
For the purposes of Chapter 9, the term "municipality" includes any
political subdivision, public agency, or instrumentality of a State.
Through the end of the 1980s, special purpose districts initiated
most Chapter 9 filings." General municipalities were responsible for
only three of the ninety Chapter 9 petitions filed between 1972
through 1991. The three general municipalities-South Tuscon, Ari-
zona; St. Louis, Missouri; and Wapanucka, Oklahoma-filed under
Chapter 9 to stall enforcement of liabilities after single incidents ex-
posed the cities to substantial judgments.22 In Wapanucka, for exam-
ple, the town condemned a local water well to provide water for resi-
dents after an oil tanker crash marred the local water supply. The
town anticipated that $5,000 would provide just compensation, but a
court awarded $112,000. The town pursued damages against the oil
company. But in the meantime, it filed a Chapter 9 petition to stall
execution of the condemnation award while its damages suit pend-
ed.2 3 General municipalities did not turn to the bankruptcy code to
resolve structural debt crises. Writing in 1993, Professors Michael
16 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
17 11 U.S.C. § 362; 11 U.S.C. § 922.
18 11 U.S.C. § 941.
19 11 U.S.C. § 944(b)-(c).
20 11 U.S.C. §101 (40).
21 Michael McConnell & Randal Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470 (1993).
22 Id. at 470-71.
23 Id. at 471.
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McConnell and Randal Picker noted that the three cities' filings indi-
cated no "need for corporate reorganization."2 4
This landscape began to change during the recession following
the 2007-2008 financial crisis in the U.S. In the 1990s, few cities at-
tempted to resolve structural budget crises through Chapter 9 filings.
The City of Bridgeport, Connecticut, became an early exception
when it filed for Chapter 9 protection in 1991, becoming the largest
city to do so at that time.2 ' The City filed for protection with the aim
of addressing deficits arising from "unaffordable employee union
contracts" and an inability to raise taxes to pay for essential services.26
The Bankruptcy Court, however, dismissed the City's petition, reason-
ing that because the City remained "solvent," it could not meet the
requirement for relief under Chapter 9.27 The Court concluded that
a city is insolvent only if it cannot pay debts as they "become due in its
current fiscal year" or the following year based on an "adopted budg-
et."2 8 Despite the City's "deep financial trouble," it could feasibly pay
its debts."
Beginning in 2008, general municipalities increasingly filed under
Chapter 9 to resolve structural budget deficits. The City of Vallejo,
California, filed a petition after running an operating deficit exceed-
ing $3 million in 2006 and $4 million in 2007.o The national eco-
nomic recession, which diminished the City's property taxes, sales
taxes, and other sources of municipal revenue, intensified the budget
crisis. California laws restrained the City's ability to raise tax rates:
Proposition 13, for example, set a cap on property tax rates. Mean-
while, the City faced escalating labor costs, which the City projected
as composing $79.4 million of its $95 million in outlays.3
In 2011, Jefferson County, Alabama, filed under Chapter 9 to ad-
just a $4.1 billion long-term debt, the largest filing in the nation's his-
tory at that time.4 The County faced $3.2 billion in debt resulting
24 Id. at 470-71.
25 Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport As A Case
Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV.J. 625, 625 (1995).
26 In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Con n. 1991).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 338.
29 Id. at 339.
30 In re City of Vallejo, Cal., No. 08-26813-A-9, 2008 WL 4180008, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
Sept. 5, 2008), affd sub nom., In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
31 Id. at *2.
32 In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. at 286.
33 Id. at 287.
34 Shelly Sigo, Bankruptcy Over, But Jefferson County, Ala., Will Remain in the News, THE BOND
BUYER, Dec. 31, 2013, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/123_1/bankruptcy-over-but-
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from warrants the County issued between 1997 and 2003 to allow
governments within the County to take on debt to rebuild and repair
sewer systems. The County subsequently assumed the debt without
compensation. When the U.S. municipal bond market's diminished
liquidity barred the County from auctioning high-interest, adjustable
rate warrants, the County fell behind on principal payments, setting
off the County's fiscal crisis.3 6
Following the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market in 2007, the
City of Stockton, California, experienced one of the highest foreclo-
sure rates in the nation. Commercial and residential property val-
ues fell 50%.-" Revenue from sales tax fell from $47 million in FY
2006 to $32.7 million in FY 2010; property tax and other sources of
revenue also fell." Prior to 2008, the City had assumed long-term
debt for financing new development and entered generous contracts
with its employees, providing health care benefits at no cost to em-
ployees' pensions based on the employee's final year of compensa-
tion, which could include payment for accrued vacation and sick
leave."0 In February 2012, the City could no longer meet debt pay-
ments as they came due, and faced a projected $700,000 deficit for FY
2012, which the City resolved by intentionally defaulting on over $2
million in bond payments.41 In June 2012, the City filed under Chap-
ter 9 after cuts in expenditures failed to stem the crisis.42
In August 2012, only two months after Stockton initiated bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the City of San Bernardino filed a petition for
jefferson-county-ala-will-remain-in-the-news-1058616-1.html. The County suffered loss of
tax revenue after the Alabama Supreme Court in 2011 affirmed a lower court's decision
to hold Alabama's "business license and occupation tax" invalid because the legislature
"advertised" it improperly. In rejefferson Cnty., Ala., 474 B.R. 228, 237 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
2012) aff'd, No. BR 11-05736-TBB, 2012 WL 3775758 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2012).
35 In rejefferson Cnly., Ala., 474 B.R. at 237.
36 Shelly Sigo, jefferson County, Ala., Takes Sewer Rating Hit, THE BOND BUYER, Feb. 26, 2008,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_36/-284135-1.html; Sigo, supra note 34. The
bankruptcy court attributed the massive cost to the County's failure to perform incremen-
tal repairs on the system. In rejefferson Cnty., Ala., 474 B.R. at 237. The court also faulted
the County for using warrants secured by the special revenue the sewer system generated,
rather than using general obligation warrants. Id. at 238. The structure of the warrants
"reduced, if not avoided, input from all of the inhabitants of the County." Id. at 239.
This limited the revenue streams available for repaying its sewer debt. Id.
37 In re City of Stockton, Cal., 493 B.R. 772, 778 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 779.
40 Id.
41 ]d. at 781, 789.
42 Id. at 779-780, 783. The City attempted to resolve the crisis by decreasing the workforce
by 25% between 2008 and 2011, eliminating medical benefits for new hires and reducing
employees' accrued sick leave. Id. at 780.
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Chapter 9 with the Central District of California, Riverside Division.
Similar to Stockton, San Bernardino's deficit largely derived from a
significant drop in property tax revenue caused by the California
housing market collapse in 2007." The City maintained outlays for
essential services as its revenue base collapsed.4 ' The bankruptcy
court granted eligibility to San Bernardino, reasoning that Chapter 9
served to "give a municipality a breathing space from a cash crunch
and an opportunity to address its long term solvency. ... " The City
had no alternative for resolving the $45.9 million cash deficit it faced
in 2012-13.47
Finally, in 2013 Detroit filed for bankruptcy. The City reached an
agreement with creditors and filed a confirmation plan that the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan confirmed in
December 2014." The plan reduced the city's debt by $7 billion.4 9
Detroit's filing aimed to address a massive debt burden the City ac-
cumulated in part during the Kilpatrick and Bing administrations to
cover the cost of the City's pension liabilities.5 0 The City's use of in-
terest-rate swaps to lock in a fixed interest rate for its new debt gener-
43 City of San Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 780 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013).
44 Id. at 778. Prior to 2007, relatively cheap housing and easy mortgage financing drew new
homeowners to San Bernardino. San Bernardino had one of the nation's highest fore-
closure rates after the financial crisis hit. Id.
45 Id. at 779. As property values fell, the City maintained its investment in public safety,
street repair, and municipal employee salaries to meet the demands of a growing popula-
tion. Id. Prior to the crisis, the City agreed to cover the employee's share of payments to
the California Public Employee Retirement System ("CalPERS"), the State's pension
management institution, which generated a significant debt the City owed to CalPERS.
Id.
46 Id. at 791.
47 Id. One creditor, the CalPERS, objected to the City's Chapter 9 filing. CalPERS claimed
that the City failed to meet two eligibility requirements: it did not file in good faith, and
had no desire to establish a debt-adjustment plan. Id. at 786. See II U.S.C. § 109(c) (4)
(providing that an entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 if and only if it "desires to ef-
fect a plan to adjust such debts"); 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (permitting the court to dismiss a
petition if a debtor does not "file the petition in good faith . . . ."). The bankruptcy court
acknowledged that the City "got off to a slow start in getting its financial records in or-
der," demonstrated "untidy disarray" of its finances, and lacked "direction toward long-
term resolution of its admitted financial distress .... " City of San Bernardino, Cal., 499
B.R. at 778. But the City's initial steps towards restructuring its debt after filing the peti-
tion allowed the court to conclude that the City met the eligibility threshold. Id. at 788.
48 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 160 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
49 Id. at 162.
50 Nathan Bormey &John Gallagher, How Detroit Went Broke: The Answers May Surprise You -
And Don't Blame Coleman Young, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 15, 2013,
http://archive.freep.com/interactive/article/20130915/NEWSOI/130801004/Detroit-
Bankruptcy-history-1950-debt-pension-revenue.
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ated substantial losses for the city.5 1 In fiscal year 2014, Detroit's ex-
penses exceeded its revenue by $198 million. Detroit's filing
marked the most recent, and by far the largest, of general municipali-
ties filing under Chapter 9. Like other general municipalities, De-
troit used bankruptcy proceedings to resolve budget crises that
stemmed from structural sources, which included deficiencies in fi-
nancial management and fiscal policy.
B. Judicial Intervention in Municipal Bankruptcy
The debt crises of general municipalities after 2008 prompted
bankruptcy scholars to scrutinize the structure and theoretical un-
derpinnings of Chapter 9."5 Chapter 9 filings from Vallejo, Jefferson,
Stockton, San Bernardino, and Detroit indicated that general munic-
ipalities embraced debt adjustment as a means for resolving structural
budget crises. But as scholars noted, Chapter 9 does not offer a suit-
able device for doing so. The code allows for debt restructuring
without directly authorizing courts to interfere in political and gov-
ernmental affairs that underlie structural deficits. In response, schol-
ars began to theorize alternative models for debt adjustment. Broad-
ly, they called for bankruptcy courts to intervene directly in
municipal affairs as a means to bypass inefficiencies in local govern-
ance that generated high-risk budget structures.
51 wALLACE C. TURBEVILLE, DcMos, THE DETROIT BANKRUPTCY 5 (2013).
52 Id. at 1.
53 Some scholarship predated 2008. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 21, at 472 (arguing
that bankruptcy law should do more than provide for debt adjustment, and instead allow
courts to address chronic financial difficulty, which indicates that "ordinary political pro-
cesses are not functioning properly"). McConnell and Picker theorized in 1993 that a
bankruptcy court should have four remedies available. First, the court should have power
to require a municipality to levy or collect taxes within the municipality's authority. Id. at
475--76. The authors suggested that a court have power to "increase taxes without a prior
state authorization," but noted that this would raise constitutional concerns. Id. at 476.
Second, the court should have authority to "order reduction in wasteful expenditures as a
condition for debt relief." Id. Third, the court should have authority to "attach particu-
lar streams of income for the repayment of bonds" such that the city may obtain more fa-
vorable terms when refinancing debt. Id. Fourth, the court should have authority to sell
municipal property when appropriate, for example property that has non-public use, like
assets acquired for nonpayment of taxes. Id. at 476-77.
For a recent critique of Chapter 9, see Juliet M. Moringiello, GoaLs and Governance in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 403, 410 (2014) (arguing that state policy-
makers should view Chapter 9 as "one component of an integrated approach to munici-
pal financial distress" that requires a sophisticated state oversight structure to comple-
ment municipal debt adjustment); Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers
ofFinancially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2014).
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1. Rethinking Chapter 9
Bankruptcy law serves two basic purposes. First, under a "con-
tractual theory," bankruptcy law aims to benefit creditors through us-
ing procedural protections that increase a debtor's value to the credi-
tor, as well as aid the debtor by reducing the cost of credit;
bankruptcy provides a system for facilitating debt collection when the
debtor becomes insolvent.5 State law generally "prioritizes the credi-
tors' rights to the debtor's assets on a first come, first serve basis."8
When a debtor nears insolvency, remedies at state law therefore in-
centivize creditors to act quickly to reclaim assets, creating a "com-
mon pool problem." While the debtor is worth more to the creditors
as a whole when it remains a viable entity, the race to claim a debtor's
assets would result in the debtor's liquidation.7 A bankruptcy regime
obviates the "common pool problem" by barring any one creditor
from making a claim on assets at the exclusion of others, thus maxim-
izing the debtor's value to the group of creditors.8 This security has
the added benefit of decreasing creditors' risk, which in turn reduces
the cost of debt.
Second, under a "fresh start theory," bankruptcy provides the
debtor an opportunity for financial rehabilitation.8  The debtor
emerges from bankruptcy with decreased debt obligations." Histori-
cally, a fresh start in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also
entailed the discharge of an individual debtor from a debtor's pris-
on.6 1 Bankruptcy thus aims to afford the debtor financial normalcy
and the chance for a renewed economic life.
As Professor Omer Kimhi argues, neither theory supports Chapter
9. Municipal insolvency, unlike private insolvency, does not trigger a
scramble to capture the debtor's assets.12  Unlike a corporation's
creditors, a creditor to a municipality may not "execute" municipal
property.13 In other words, the municipal creditor may not require
54 Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 351, 354 (2010).
55 Id. at 370.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 354, 372.
60 Kimhi, supra note 54, at 354.
61 See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 364 (2006) ("The term 'discharge'
historically had a dual meaning; it referred to both release of debts and release of the
debtor from prison.").
62 Kimhi, supra note 54, at 371.
63 Id.
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the municipality to convey property in fulfillment of its obligations.
No "common pool" problem arises. Chapter 9 therefore does not in-
crease the municipality's value to its creditors. Rather, debt adjust-
ment diminishes the municipality's value.5 Despite insolvency, mu-
nicipal tax revenue may still allow the municipality to pay its
obligations." In the event the municipality cannot meet its bills, state
laws generally provide an avenue through which creditors may re-
quire the municipality to increase taxes to cover its obligations.
Through Chapter 9, on the other hand, all creditors end up with
less.8
Nor does the "fresh start theory" justify Chapter 9, according to
Professor Kimhi."9 In theory, debt adjustment affords the municipali-
ty relief. Chapter 9 allows the municipality to "negotiate a debt read-
justment agreement from a position of power.,70 Adjustment allows
the municipality to reduce its debt, which in turn allows the munici-
pality to reduce tax rates or improve services." Productivity increases,
as does economic activity.7 2 Increased economic activity in turn gen-
erates greater tax revenue.
The municipal "fresh start" rests on flawed assumptions. Professor
Kimhi's brief analysis of the reasons for local fiscal crises indicates
that crises reflect structural problems, not single-instance shocks aris-
ing from accidents or the inept managerial work of a single bureau-
crat. First, crises often track socioeconomic phenomena, which may
include economic recessions or the outmigration of high-income
households from a distressed city.74 Second, the structure of munici-
pal politics plays a significant role in generating operating deficits.
For example, municipalities that have politically fragmented popula-
tions and substantial interest group activity tend to have a higher risk
75of budget crisis.
64 Id. The only exception to the restriction on execution may include property that serves
no public function of the municipality. Id. (citing ROBERT AMDURSKY & CIAYrON
GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1992)).
65 Id. at 371-72.
66 Id. at 372.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 374.
70 Kimbi, supra note 54, at 372-73.
71 Id. at 373.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 376.
75 Id. at 379. In New York, special interests assumed an increasingly significant role in the
municipal budget-making process, giving rise to structural overspending as
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If municipal budget crises have structural origins, then Chapter 9
cannot afford municipalities a fresh start. Debt adjustment may re-
duce a municipality's obligations to creditors; it does not change the
political or socioeconomic climate that obstructed payment of credi-
tors." Thus, while Chapter 9 proves useful for a city facing a crip-
pling single-instance liability,"7 it is poorly suited for giving a munici-
pality with a diminished tax base a "fresh start." Professor Kimhi
contends that state intervention offers a superior means for rehabili-
tating distressed municipalities than Chapter 9,78 but other bankrupt-
cy scholars have theorized that the bankruptcy code itself could pro-
vide adequate remedies for municipalities facing structural budget
crises.
A bankruptcy court could feasibly assume an active role in a mu-
nicipality's Chapter 9 proceedings to remedy structural problems
generating excessive debt. Bankruptcy scholars have proposed two
means for doing so: first, a bankruptcy court could impose tax in-
creases on a municipality as a condition of Chapter 9 debt adjust-
ment; second, a court could require that a municipality change its
governance structure to insulate decision-making processes from in-
terest group politics and other forces contributing to excessive out-
lays.
2. The Role of Resource Adjustments
Contrary to Professor Kimhi's proposal, a federal bankruptcy
judge may be best positioned to aid a municipality in restoring its fi-
nancial condition through the use of Chapter 9 proceedings. Chap-
ter 9 presents the risk that municipalities may seek debt adjustments
for lack of political will. 79  Orange County, California, for example,
decisionmakers attempted to appease all interest groups. Id. at 379 n.157 (citing ESTER
R_ FuCHS, MAYORS AND MONEY: FISCAL POLICY IN NEw YORK AND CHICAGO 242-43 (1992)
for the proposition that New York City's interest groups played a significant role in caus-
ing the City's fiscal crisis in the 1970s).
76 Id. at 380.
77 See, e.g., supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (noting that most municipalities histor-
ically initiated Chapter 9 filings to deal with single incidents that exposed them to signifi-
cant judgments, not to resolve structural debt crises).
78 Kimhi, supra note 54, at 385-87 (reasoning that a state is better situated to address socio-
economic and political factors contributing to local fiscal crises). A state has the authori-
ty to resolve matters external to the municipality, for example, by implementing a tax sys-
tem to reduce the effects of suburbanization or using "countercyclical revenue-sharing
aid" to soften the impact of national economic recessions. Id.
79 Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 283-84 (2012) (explaining that the default on municipal debt may
stem from residents' refusal to accept onerous obligations incurred by political officials).
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filed for debt adjustment after its $6.6 billion investment in deriva-
tives collapsed."o The County Treasurer's management strategy in-
troduced significant risk to the County's investment portfolio, which
produced losses that the County could have covered with a half-cent
increase in the County sales tax lasting ten years. The County's resi-
dents rejected the proposal.8 ' The decision meant that the County's
creditors, rather than taxpayers, bore the loss. 2 As Orange County's
insolvency illustrates, the existing federal bankruptcy regime allows
municipalities to shift costs to creditors. It may also shift costs to cen-
tralized governments responsible for effecting bailouts to protect the
fiscal health of other subdivisions. This liability allocation means that
municipalities avoid internalizing the costs of fiscal policymaking."
Bankruptcy judges may help resolve this problem.
As a solution to this inefficiency, Professor Clayton Gillette pro-
poses that federal bankruptcy courts "impose resource adjustments
on defaulting municipalities that appear to lack political will as op-
posed to financial resources."84  The term "resource adjustment"
means an adjustment in tax or spending structure." By imposing re-
source adjustments, bankruptcy courts may cause municipalities to
internalize the costs of fiscal policy, thereby reducing municipalities'
incentives to use bankruptcy proceedings "strategically."6
The language of Section 904 of Chapter 9 may seem to preclude
such judicial interference. The law provides that "unless the debtor
consents or the [debt adjustment] plan so provides, the court may
not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere
with ... any of the property or revenues of the debtor."8  Nor may
the court "interfere with ... any of the political or governmental
powers of the debtor."" Yet, as Gillette proposes, bankruptcy judges
80 In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 598 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). The derivatives, called
"inverse floaters," generated yield when the interest rate on underlying assets decreased.
Id. at 598 n.5. See generally PUB. POLIcY INST. OF CAL., WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILs: THE
ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY, A POLIcY SUMMARY (1998) (detailing the county treasur-
er's risky investment strategy that ultimately forced Orange County into filing for bank-
ruptcy).
81 Gillette, supra note 79, at 284.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 289 (noting that although fiscal federalism requires that municipalities internalize
the costs of fiscal decisions, "[t]he current legal structure for addressing municipal fiscal
distress ... reduces the need for distressed localities to internalize" these decisions).
84 Id. at 327.
85 Id. at 285.
86 Id. at 290.
87 11 U.S.C. § 904(2).
88 Id. § 904(1).
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retain discretion-primarily at three points during the course of
Chapter 9 proceedings-that may allow for imposition of resource
adjustments."
First, because only "insolvent" municipalities may file under Chap-
ter 9, judges have the authority to interpret the municipality's ability
to "prospectively" pay its bills to require that default be "imminent
and certain," meaning that the municipality would have no Chapter 9
eligibility until it exhausted resource adjustment options.90 Second, a
bankruptcy court could take into account whether the debtor enter-
tained the possibility of resource adjustments during negotiations
with creditors.91 Chapter 9 requires that a municipality demonstrate
it "negotiated in good faith with creditors" and "failed to obtain the
agreement of creditors... .". A bankruptcy judge could consider the
debtor's willingness to implement resource adjustments as an ele-
ment in assessing whether Section 109 negotiations occurred in good
faith. A decision to deny eligibility, or the threat of such denial,
could pressure the municipality to implement resource adjustments.
Third, a bankruptcy judge may incentivize resource adjustments
89 Gillette, supra note 79, at 295.
90 Id. (citing In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337-39 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991), where
the court denied the City of Bridgeport Chapter 9 eligibility because it had access to a
bond proceed fund that could cover its $16 million deficit for the current fiscal year). As
Gillette argues, the court could also have "agreed with Bridgeport that failure to provide
immediate relief simply deferred to the near future the city's inability to generate reve-
nues sufficient to meet all its obligations," which would have allowed the City to satisfy the
insolvency test of Chapter 9. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (3) (requiring that a debtor under
Chapter 9 be insolvent); 11 U.S.C § 101(32)(C)(i)-(ii) (defining "insolvent" for a munici-
pality t6 mean a "financial condition such that the municipality is" "generally not paying
its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute," or
"unable to pay its debts as they become due"). See also City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 338
(concluding "that to be found insolvent a city must prove that it will be unable to pay its
debts as they become due in its current fiscal year or, based on an adopted budget, in its
next fiscal year").
91 Gillette, supra note 79, at 295.
92 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (5) (B).
93 Gillette notes that at least one bankruptcy court has employed this reasoning. Gillette,
supra note 79, at 295-96. A bankruptcy court denied Chapter 9 eligibility to the Sullivan
County Regional Refuse Disposal District because the debtors "never exercised their as-
sessment powers prior to coming into the bankruptcy court" and attempted to "ignore[]"
their assessment power when negotiating with creditors. In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg'1 Refuse
Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 78 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). The court noted that case law does
not treat exhaustion of taxation power as a requirement for Chapter 9 eligibility, but
found the debtors' resource adjustment avoidance sufficiently egregious to support deni-
al of eligibility. Id. (explaining that although municipal debtors are not required to es-
tablish "that they have exercised their taxing powers to the maximum extent possible,"
the debtors' inaction in this case established their failure to negotiate in good faith).
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through the confirmation of a debt adjustment plan.4 A plan must
serve the "best interests of creditors."5 Resource adjustments could
either remove the need for debt adjustment or lessen the degree of
an adjustment. A bankruptcy judge may therefore take into consid-
eration the feasibility of resource adjustments when assessing whether
a plan serves creditors' best interests.
This last theory has precedent in bankruptcy law preceding the
enactment of the modem bankruptcy code. In 1940, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected an irrigation district's proposed adjustment plan on
grounds that it failed to serve the "best interests of the creditors."96
Even though in the current fiscal year the district had inadequate
funds for paying debts as they came due, it made no showing that its
power of taxation could not produce revenue sufficient to meet its
obligations."' The court rejected the plan for failing to meet the
creditors' best interests." Some scholarship on municipal bankruptcy
suggests that judicial intervention is unnecessary for remedying os-
tensible cost-shifting. Professor Kevin Kordana argues that Chapter
9's failure to "compel tax increases is, in fact, appropriate."" First,
the "moral hazard" rationale for tax increases fails because reputa-
tional concerns, and the need for a municipality to remain an attrac-
tive investment, reign in "municipal opportunism.""o' Second, he ar-
gues, investors are better suited to bear risk than a municipality's
residents.'o
But judicially-imposed tax increases, or other resource adjust-
ments, do more than mitigate moral hazard. First, opportunism does
not offer the sole explanation for a municipal decisionmaker's at-
tempt to avoid tax increases during crisis. Electoral politics, interest
group politics, and sociopolitical fragmentation may stymie a munici-
94 Gillette, supra note 79, at 296.
95 See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) ("The court shall confirm the plan if [it] is in the best interests
of creditors and is feasible.").
96 Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 1940).
97 See id. at 565-66 ("[W]e are unable to find any reason why the tax rate should not have
been increased sufficiently to meet the District's obligations or why it can be said that the
plan is ... for the 'best interest of the creditors' with no sufficient showing that
the taxing power was inadequate to raise the taxes to pay them."). See also In re Corcoran
Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 461 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) (confirming a hospital district's
debt adjustment plan because the debtor "could not raise taxes sufficient to pay more" to
creditors).
98 Fano, 114 F.2d at 566.
99 Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankrupicies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1038
(1997).
100 Id. at 1038-39.
101 Id. at 1039.
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pality's genuine efforts to increase revenue or cut expenditures.
While a debt adjustment plan may not subvert a state law restricting
*102tax increases, judicial intervention may place pressure on taxpayers
to approve an otherwise disfavored tax increase. Political pressures
may also block tax increases even where voter approval is not re-
quired, thus allowing adoption of a debt adjustment plan that re-
quires a tax increase. A bankruptcy court, by conditioning Chapter 9
eligibility or confirmation on resource adjustments, may allow a mu-
nicipality to implement adjustments that it could not achieve alone.o3
Second, as Professor Gillette argues, fiscal federalism provides a
strong justification for judicial intervention.1 0 4 Fiscal federalism posits
that centralized governments should protect the financial independ-
ence of local governments so they may pursue unique governmental
preferences. The imposition of resource adjustments preserves fiscal
self-governance by minimizing the ability of local governments to file
strategically under Chapter 9. A municipality may use the threat of
bankruptcy as a means for extracting bailouts from central govern-
ments, for example a state government. Central governments often
impose stringent obligations on local governments as a condition of
bailout. The availability of obligation-free bankruptcy proceedings,
however, may allow the municipality to obtain a bailout from a cen-
tralized government at lower cost. Imposition of resource adjust-
102 SeeKimbi, supra note 54, at 377-78 (explaining that state oversight restricts the fiscal deci-
sions of local governments).
103 A court does not have authority to approve a tax increase if state law prohibits such ac-
tion. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b) (6) (conditioning a court's confirmation of a debt adjustment
plan on the debtor's compliance with all applicable nonbankruptcy law). If state law re-
quires voter approval to authorize a tax increase, bankruptcy judges must reject a plan
that introduces taxes or bonds secured by tax assessments without an election as required
under state law. See, e.g., In re City of Colorado Springs Spring Creek Gen. Improvement
Dist., 177 B.R. 684, 693 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) ("Though Congress intended Chapter 9
to be a forum for reorganization of municipalities, it is clear that Congress did not intend
for federal bankruptcy law to supersede or impair the power of the state to create, limit,
authorize or control a municipality in the exercise of its political or governmental pow-
ers."). The court in Spring Creek General Improvement District noted that "[u]nlike any other
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 9 places federal law in juxtaposition to the
rights of states to create and govern their own subdivisions." Id. Thus, the court rea-
soned that it could not confirm a plan that "proposes action not authorized by state law"
or fails to meet the requirements of state law. Id. at 694. To preserve state authority, the
court rejected the debt adjustment plan because it required issuance of bonds secured by
a tax increase that voters had not voted to approve. Id. at 694-95 (concluding that, be-
cause Colorado law required electoral approval of a bond issuance, an election was neces-
sary); see aLbo In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 975-76 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1989) (denying confirmation of plan because it contained provisions in violation of
state law).
104 See Gillette, supra note 79, at 300.
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ments for municipalities filing under Chapter 9 thus limits a munici-
pality's ability to use bankruptcy strategically. This in turn safeguards
a central government's independence in administering its re-
105sources.
3. The Role of Govemance Restructuring
For municipalities facing structural debt crises, debt adjustment
alone may not return a municipality to fiscal health. Chapter 9 allows
a municipality to reduce its debt obligations, but this may not fix po-
litical, socioeconomic, and governmental problems that caused fiscal
distress. It does little to impact the failure of governmental structures
to control municipal debt accumulation.
As a solution, Professors Gillette and David Skeel propose that
municipal bankruptcy procedures enable courts "to address the core
political failures that have generated financial failure."'o As they ar-
gue, the "logic of the municipal bankruptcy process requires govern-
ance reform.",o' In Chapter 11 proceedings courts routinely inter-
vene in corporate governance to address shortcomings in corporate
decision-making processes that brought the debtor to bankruptcy."'
Courts have authority to reform a board of directors. They may also
transfer voting control to a trustee or other institution for a specified
amount of time to produce a centralized decision-making system. "
The anatomy of municipal fiscal crises indicates that deficiencies
in governance play a substantial role in generating distress. First,
governmental structure may expose a municipality to budgetary risk.
For example, municipalities with a larger number of voting districts
tend to assume a larger, and therefore more expensive, govern-
ment.' Evidence also suggests that governance structures that con-
centrate authority with a mayor, especially through veto power, may
105 Id. at 288-90; 299-320 (demonstrating how, in a dual system of bailouts and bankruptcy,
court-imposed resource adjustments may mitigate the strategic behavior of distressed
municipalities).
106 Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in
Municipal Bankruptcy 2 (Sept. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
https://bfi.uchicago.edu/research/working-paper/governance-reform-and-judicial-role-
municipal-bankruptcy.
107 Id. at 3.
108 Id. at 11-12 (noting that bankruptcy court intervention has become a regular part of
Chapter 11 cases).
109 Id. at 12-19 (explaining the various forms of judicial intervention that enable corporate
debtors to achieve governance reform under Chapter 11).
110 See Reza Baqir, Districting and Government Overspending, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1318 (2002)
(finding that increased districting corresponds with greater government activity).
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curtail government spending."' These general observations suggest
that fragmentation, a term describing the degree to which a govern-
ment insulates decisionmakers from internalizing the costs of budg-
etary choices, plays a role in undermining sound fiscal manage-
ment."'2  Second, governmental structure also impacts the types of
decisionmaking practices a municipality's leaders favor, which in turn
impacts fiscal conditions."3
To address governance deficiencies, Professors Gillette and Skeel
propose that bankruptcy courts impose restructuring requirements
on municipalities as a condition of plan confirmation."4 A bankrupt-
cy plan must remedy problems arising from fragmented governance;
a restructuring must subject officials to budget constraints and inter-
111 Id. at 1321 (finding that cities that concentrate power in the city mayor "are able to break
the relationship between districting and the size of government spending").
112 In New York City, for example, the Board of Estimate exposed the budget-making process
to contending interests, by dividing budget authority among the mayor, the comptroller,
the City Council president, and each borough president who belonged to the Board of
Estimate. Through lack of control, interest groups influenced municipal budget deci-
sions. See ESTER R. FUCHS, MAYORS AND MONEY: FISCAL POLICY IN NEW YORK AND
CHICAGO 214-25 (1992) (comparing New York City's fragmented budget-making process
with Chicago's highly centralized process, which concentrated budget control with the
mayor, thus minimizing the involvement of interest groups). After New York City re-
solved its fiscal crisis in 1978, the City's fragmented interest groups continued to encour-
age leaders to serve parochial interests. As one urban scholar argues, Mayor Ed Koch's
coalition built its municipal development decisions around the politics of serving constit-
uency interests, rather than economic needs. JOHN HULL MOLLENKOPF, A PHOENIX IN
THE ASHES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE KOCH COALITION IN NEW YORK CITY POLITICS 44-
49 (1992). The Koch administration favored pro-growth development policy in the years
following 1978, for example, granting tax abatements to incentivize increased commer-
cial development. Id. at 146-47. The City also used extensive off-the-budget measures,
for example, through administration of zoning laws, to expand intensified commercial
development. Id. at 146. By the early 1980s, the administration also increased spending
on public employment to strengthen its alliance with public employee unions. Id. at 131-
39, 161. While the administration consistently ran a balanced budget, id. at 138, its
allocational decisions demonstrate how the City's budget remained exposed to demands
from fragmented political constituencies that exerted forceful claims on municipal re-
sources.
113 See, e.g., REBECCA M. HENDRICK, MANAGING THE FISCAL METROPOLIS: THE FINANCIAL
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND HEALTH OF SUBURBAN MUNICIPALITIES (107-08) (2011) (ex-
plaining that while managers may ignore or work around rules that "affect the tools that
are chosen from the fiscal toolbox," the municipality's "approach to governance can
make certain tools or fiscal decisions more desirable than others"); id. at 9 (concluding
that the "form of government is useful in predicting and explaining governments' choice
of tools from the fiscal toolbox" because the "professionalization" of decisions is greater
for governments with a "council-manager form and a finance director" as compared to
governments with a "council-mayor form and with no finance director").
114 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 106, at 1-4. See id. at 30-31 ("[I]f a city's governance dysfunc-
tions are severe, a bankruptcy judge should not confirm a restructuring plan that leaves
the governance crisis unaddressed.").
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nalize the ramifications of decisions. The precise nature of any re-
structuring requirement will vary on a case-by-case basis. But restruc-
turing requirements will generally involve reformulation of municipal
budget-making procedures, organizational relationships, and audit-
ing policies.'
II. FEDERALISM
Proposals calling for bankruptcy courts to exercise greater author-
ity over municipal functions offer cursory analysis of the constitution-
al implications inherent to the proposed reforms."6 Yet, since the
1990s, doctrines of federalism have assumed a more forceful position
115 See id. at 27 (describing proposed amendments to the bankruptcy laws that recognized
the need for municipal bankruptcy to facilitate governance reform). During New York
City's 1970s fiscal crisis, Congress began considering amendments to the federal bank-
ruptcy code to allow large municipalities like New York City to enter debt adjustment
proceedings. A bankruptcy judge, Joseph Patchan, recommended amendments to the
bankruptcy code that would facilitate governance restructuring. Judge Patchan proposed
that federal courts allow individuals outside a municipality's administration to have
"standing in court" to call for the "restructuring of local government functions." Id. (cit-
ing testimony ofJudge Patchan in hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, Sub-
committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights). Judge Patchan elaborated:
It may be necessary in particular cases for certain city functions to be shouldered
by new, State-formed authorities; accordingly, new State legislation may be re-
quired. For example, an analysis of city financing may indicate that operation of
perhaps a sewer system, or a transit company, or the airport burdens the city both
financially and managerially. Obviously, these functions must be continued by
someone else, perhaps by State, county, or regional authorities. In order to set up
these new functioning units, State law may be necessary.
Bankr. Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and HR. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 649 (1975) (testimony ofJoseph
Patchan,J.). Because state law could play a substantial role in restructuring, he deemed it
important "to bring into the mix of plan formulation and responsibility parties who can
deliver the necessary State or county support to make this transfer of obligations and du-
ties possible." Id. To achieve this, Judge Patchan recommended that a bankruptcy court
have authority to "appoint a committee of relevant officials," as appropriate for a given
case, which would have power to propose a plan for restructuring governmental func-
tions, and back the plan they endorse. Id. at 650.
116 See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 730-32 (2012) (as-
sessing the potential constitutional issues implicated by the establishment of a federal
oversight board); David E. Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surmiving a Tenth Amendment Challenge,
42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 217, 234-37 (2012) (inquiring into whether a state-
bankruptcy chapter runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment). For analysis of the constitu-
tionality of municipal bankruptcy under the Tenth Amendment between National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan. Transit Author-
ity, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), see Daniel J. Goldberg, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Need for an Ex-
panded Chapter IX, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 91, 99-103 (1976); Note, Municipal Bankrupt-
cy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1871 (1976) (examining
the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy in the wake of Usery, and concluding that
Chapter 9's statutory scheme is constitutional).
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in the Supreme Court's review of congressional action. The Court's
heightened sensitivity to the nation's balance of federalism raises sub-
stantial obstacles to more assertive municipal bankruptcy procedures.
For bankruptcy courts to assume greater influence over municipal
taxation or governance during the course of Chapter 9 proceedings,
the exertion of federal authority must comport with doctrines secur-
ing the sovereignty, as well as dignity, of states and their subdivisions.
The Supreme Court's theories on commandeering, coercion, and
comity together form the key impediments to increased judicial au-
thority. The following analysis asks whether doctrines of federalism
allow for judge-imposed resource adjustments and governance re-
structuring. It proposes that the basis for increased judicial authority
rests in the Supreme Court's recent decisions that interpreted the
Bankruptcy Clause as circumscribing state sovereign immunity.
A. Commandeering
During Detroit's Chapter 9 proceedings, creditors objected to the
City's eligibility on the theory that Chapter 9 unconstitutionally im-
pinged on state sovereignty."' Specifically, the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") argued that
while in 1938 the Supreme Court upheld a federal municipal bank-
ruptcy law in United States v. Bekins,"" the Supreme Court's reassertion
of constitutional federalism in the 1990s undermined Bekins."9 Two
cases, New York v. United States2 0 and Printz v. United States,'2 , together
signaled the emergence of a new federalism regime proscribing the
commandeering of local government functions. Prior to Bekins, the
Supreme Court rejected Congress's first attempt at a municipal bank-
ruptcy law, reasoning that the law subjected the financial obligations
117 The Michigan Council 25 of the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Em-
ployees, AFL-CIO and Sub-Chapter 98, City of Detroit Retirees' Objection to the City of
Detroit's Eligibility to Obtain Relief Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code ¶¶ 40-62,
In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
AFSCME's Objection to Eligibility].
118 304 U.S. 27 (1938). Two years prior to Bekins, the Court held a municipal bankruptcy law
unconstitutional, reasoning that the law subjected states and their political subdivisions to
interferences that diminished their sovereignty. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Imp.
Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 530-31 (1936) (concluding that if the federal government
were able to act under the bankruptcy clause at issue, it would "impose its will and impair
state powers-pass laws inconsistent with the idea of sovereignty").
119 See AFSCME's Objection to Eligibility, supra note 117, ¶ 46 (asserting that a series of Su-
preme Court opinions underscored the importance of individual liberty and the inability
of the federal government to exercise control over powers within the state's sphere).
120 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
121 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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of states and their political subdivisions to federal interference, de-
priving local governments of the right to self-management.2 2  The
Supreme Court's commandeering cases, AFSCME argued, signaled
that such reasoning should again govern the question of whether
municipal bankruptcy law fell within Congress's authority.12 1
The Court first took up the issue of commandeering in New York v.
United States. 12 The case presented the question of whether provi-
sions of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 198512' amounted to an unconstitutional interference in the
"proper division of authority between the Federal Government and
the States."26 Congress enacted the law to assist states in disposing of
low-level radioactive waste after two of the nation's three remaining
sites for radioactive waste storage closed, leaving South Carolina
alone to store waste produced throughout the United States.12 1 After
an earlier law failed to resolve the crisis, Congress passed the 1986
law, which allowed states to enter compacts, and established three in-
centives to encourage the formation of compacts. The first incentive
allowed states maintaining disposal sites to impose a surcharge on
other states' waste, placing a portion of the surcharge into an escrow
account that states could receive allocations from if they met certain
objectives.'29 The second incentive allowed states and regional com-
pacts that maintained disposal sites to deny access to states that failed
122 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Imp. Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 530-31 (1936) ("[The
bankruptcy code] undertakes to extend the supposed power of the federal government
incident to bankruptcy over any embarrassed district which may apply to the court.").
The Ashton Court held that a constitutional bar on taxation of states and their political
subdivisions also compelled a bar on federal bankruptcy legislation. Id. at 532 (citing
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
123 AFSCMIE's Objection to Eligibility, supra note 117 ¶1 46-52 ("By outsourcing to the fed-
eral judiciary the problem of a state reorganizing its obligations, chapter 9 provides states
with unconstitutional-as well as unnecessary, given Asbury Park-cover from its citizens
by confusing them as to whom to accord 'blame' and 'credit' for the results."). AFSCME
reasoned that states have authority to manage bankruptcy internally because the Court in
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City ofAsbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), held that under certain
circumstances, a state may adjust its obligations to creditors without violating the Con-
tracts Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See AFSCM-E's Objection
to Eligibility, supra note 117 145.
124 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
125 Pub. L. 99-240 (1986).
126 New York, 505 U.S. at 149.
127 Id. at 150.
128 Pub. L. 96-573 (1980). The law failed to resolve the crisis because it contained no penal-
ties for states that declined to participate. Five years following the law's enactment, only
three regional compacts had taken form. New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
129 Id. at 171-73.
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to meet federal deadlines."' The Court upheld these provisions as
constitutional under Congress's spending and commerce powers."'
The Court however struck down the third incentive, called the
"take title provision."' The incentive provided that for any low-level
radioactive waste that a state cannot dispose, the state must, at the re-
quest of any waste generator, take title to the waste.3 3  The state
would then become liable for any damages arising from failure to
take possession of the waste. As an alternative to taking ownership
over waste, a state could chose to implement regulations according to
requirements Congress established.1 85  As Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote for the majority, each option standing alone ex-
ceeded Congress's legislative authority.3 1 Under the doctrine Justice
O'Connor developed throughout her opinion, Congress may not
"require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions."'3 '
Accordingly the Constitution did not allow Congress to instruct a
state to take title to waste. Nor did it allow Congress to require state
governments to enact regulations.' Congress also exceeded the
Constitution's bounds by requiring a state to choose between the two
. * 139
unconstitutional provisions.
Justice O'Connor developed two bases for limiting congressional
authority. First, she looked to the reasoning that motivated delegates
at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention to choose the Constitution over
alternative models. Justice O'Connor noted that the Convention en-
tertained two models of federal government, the Virginia Plan and
the New Jersey Plan.'" The Virginia Plan proposed giving Congress
legislative authority over individuals; it would not use states as inter-
mediaries. On the other hand, the New Jersey Plan would require
states to approve Congress's legislative enactments. Delegates object-
ed to the New Jersey Plan. They feared it would require the federal
government to force states into implementing legislation. Virginia
delegate Edmund Randolph cautioned that the national government
offered a superior model because coercion over states would prove
130 Id. at 173-74.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 177.
133 Id. at 153.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 174-75.
136 Id. at 175-76.
137 Id. at 162.
138 Id. at 176.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 164.
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"impracticable, expensive, [and] cruel to individuals."1 4 ' For this rea-
son, Randolph favored national legislation. After the Convention
decided in favor of the Virginia Plan, delegates faced the task of con-
vincing state ratifying conventions of the Virginia Plan's merits.
They assured their conventions that the proposed Constitution made
no attempt to "coerce sovereign bodies, states, in their political ca-
pacity"; the Constitution's coercive power "single [d] out
the ... individual."'" Justice O'Connor read this history to suggest
that by "explicitly" opting for a Constitution that authorizes Congress
to regulate individuals, the Framers intended to bar the regulation of
states. 145
Second, Justice O'Connor considered the vital role that political
accountability plays in a democratic system of government. Congress
may influence state activity and legislative decisions through attach-
ing requirements to the provision of federal funds.'" A state may
agree to receive the funds and the requirements attached, or it may
not. Voters may voice their disapproval of requirements attached to a
spending program by replacing their representatives with individuals
who similarly disfavor the federal requirements.1' But where a state
has no choice but to follow Congress's orders, state officials may
"bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the elec-
toral ramifications of their decision."' To maintain a viable system
of political accountability, Justice O'Connor reasoned, states must re-
tain authority to regulate according to the will of the local elec-
torate.49
In Printz v. United States, the Court extended the reasoning of New
York v. United States to bar Congress from compelling the executive
functions, rather than legislative acts, of state and municipal offic-
ers.1so The United States in Printz argued that the Brady Handgun
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 165.
144 New York, 505 U.S. at 165 (internal citation omitted).
145 Id. at 166.
146 See S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) ("Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds ... to further broad policy objectives.") (internal quotation omit-
ted).
147 New York, 505 U.S. at 167-169.
148 Id. at 169.
149 Id.
150 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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Violence Prevention Act,'" which required chief law enforcement of-
ficers to check the backgrounds of prospective handgun purchasers,
should fall outside New York's holding because it directed the actions
of state and local enforcement officers, not state legislatures.1 1
2 Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected this proposition.
A law that directs the action of local executive officials "leaves no
'policymaking' discretion with the States."15' Thus, he reasoned, con-
gressional action requiring states to implement policy in specified
arenas, may in fact intrude less on state autonomy.
Printz expanded the reasoning undergirding commandeering
doctrine. Justice Scalia's analysis drew on two structural features of
the Constitution. First, the Constitution's establishment of "dual sov-
ereignty"'5 5 through the division of state and federal spheres aimed to
ensure "structural protections of liberty."'5 ' A federal order for a state
official to perform a function would erode this division. Second,
commandeering of local governments' executive officials would un-
dermine "the separation and equilibration of powers between the
three branches of the Federal Government itself."' 7 It would do so by
requiring local officials, rather than the President, to execute federal
law, effectively bypassing the executive branch and reducing the Pres-
ident's power.'"
Two elements of Justice O'Connor's discussion in New York v.
United States have particular significance for municipal bankruptcy
law. First, Justice O'Connor's analysis raises the issue of whether a
municipality may waive its right to legislative autonomy by volunteer-
ing to participate in bankruptcy proceedings. State respondents who
intervened to defend the law explained that officials from the State of
New York supported the law's enactment.5 If state officials consent-
151 The law provided that a chief law enforcement officer must "make a reasonable effort to
ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in
violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems
are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General." Brady Hand-
gun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 2, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 922) (quoted in Printz, 521 U.S. at 933) (alteration in brackets provided by
the Court).
152 Id. at 927.
153 Id. at 928 (quotingJudge Joseph Sneed's expressed fear of reducing states to "puppets of
a ventriloquist Congress" in Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975)).
154 Prinlz, 521 U.S. at 928
155 Id. at 918 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
156 Printz, 521 U.S. at 921.
157 Id. at 922.
158 Id.
159 New York v. Uniled States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
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ed to the statute's enactment, they argued, then it should follow that
the take-title provision did not infringe on state sovereignty." Justice
O'Connor's response clarified that "[t] he Constitution does not pro-
tect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States," but rather
for "the protection of individuals.""' The consent of state officials
cannot authorize Congress to act beyond its authority under the Con-
stitution. Justice O'Connor concluded: "The constitutional authority
of Congress cannot be expanded by the 'consent' of the governmen-
tal unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the
Executive Branch or the States."1 6 2
This language raises problems for municipal bankruptcy. Con-
gress amended the bankruptcy code in 1994 to require that state law
"specifically authorize" a municipality filing under Chapter 9 "to be a
debtor."" But Justice O'Connor's language suggests that this provi-
sion will not solve constitutional issues. Additionally, while a munici-
pality's decision to file under Chapter 9 may amount to consent, a
court could nonetheless deem unconstitutional federal actions re-
quiring resource adjustments or changes in governance structure.
Second, Justice O'Connor's defense of commandeering doctrine
reveals its limits. Her opinion drew a distinction between congres-
sional and judicial authority, indicating that bankruptcy judges could
compel states and their subdivisions in ways that Congress cannot.6 4
To defend the take-title provision, the United States noted that fed-
eral courts exercised authority "to order state officials to comply with
federal law."'"5 In rejecting the United States's theory, Justice
O'Connor observed that the "text of the Constitution plainly confers
this authority on the federal courts," whereas the text lends no such
authority to Congress.'" While it is not clear what limitations Justice
O'Connor envisioned applying to judicial authority, her reasoning
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 New York, 505 U.S. at 182. Judge Steven Rhodes, in responding to creditors' argument
that New York barred Detroit's eligibility for bankruptcy, described this language as "puz-
zling." In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 148 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
163 SeePub. L. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994); 11 U.S.C. 109(c) (2).
164 New York, 505 U.S. at 179.
165 Id. (referencing the United States' citation to Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958);
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
among other cases).
166 New York, 505 U.S. at 179 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2). Justice O'Connor elaborated
that because "the Supremacy Clause makes federal law paramount over the contrary posi-
tions of state officials," the enforcement authority of federal courts "presumes some au-
thority to order state officials to comply." Id. (citing Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S.
219, 227-28 (1987)).
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suggests that coercive action arising from the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion may survive a commandeering challenge. The exercise of ju-
dicial discretion in bankruptcy proceedings, however, does not entail
the enforcement of clear federal norms, as is the case with school de-
segregation orders or other actions resulting in injunctive relief that
compels the operations of local governments."' A Chapter 9 debtor
has not necessarily violated federal law, and thus the Supremacy
Clause" may not help ensure broader authority for bankruptcy judg-
es.
Most importantly, the theoretical justifications for the Court's
commandeering principles do not compel federal restraint in the
context of municipal bankruptcy. As the opinions of Justices
O'Connor and Scalia suggest, commandeering doctrine derives from
the Court's concern for preserving three features of a federalist sys-
tem: local legislative autonomy, political accountability of federal
representatives, and the separation of federal branches of govern-
ment. The intervention of federal bankruptcy courts does not impli-
cate these three concerns.
First, judicial intervention preserves legislative autonomy of states
and municipalities. It would compel local governments only in nar-
row contexts, namely where a government faces insolvency. A bank-
ruptcy code that contemplates judicially-compelled resource adjust-
ments or governance restructuring therefore does not have the effect
of broadly subverting local autonomy. Additionally, a bankruptcy
judge may require legislative action without enumerating the exact
features of the legislation, allowing a local government to decide how
precisely to achieve necessary reforms.
Second, judicial intervention preserves political accountability.
Local officials may retain discretion in how they conform with a
judge's order to effect reforms. Local officials, not federal officials,
remain ultimately responsible for the ramifications of an enactment.
Furthermore, the decision to file under Chapter 9 rests with local of-
ficials. Thus, local taxpayers may properly assign blame for the con-
sequences of a filing to these officials.
167 See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
168 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.").
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Third, judicial intervention respects the Constitution's allocation
of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In
Printz, Congress acted directly on local officials, thereby circumvent-
ing checks that the executive branch places on legislative authority.
Judicial intervention in a bankruptcy proceeding, on the other hand,
merely supplants the executive with the judiciary. A bankruptcy
judge has no power to act without authorization from Congress. Nor
does Congress receive independent power to compel local govern-
ments through Chapter 9. Congress may authorize authority to com-
pel government action. But a bankruptcy judge retains discretion in
evaluating how to use power that Congress delegates.
B. Coercion
By conditioning eligibility or approval of an adjustment plan on
requirements that impinge on a municipality's self-governance, a
bankruptcy judge may raise the threat of undue influence. Bank-
ruptcy courts may impose resource adjustments or changes in gov-
ernance by denying a debtor Chapter 9 eligibility or rejecting adjust-
ment plans based on the debtor's failure to meet judge-imposed
requirements. In this scenario, a debtor would amend the plan to
meet the judge's request as a condition for receiving confirmation, or
implement tax increase as a condition of receiving eligibility. This
judicial intervention runs the risk of falling under the rubric of coer-
cion.
Congress may direct states and their subdivisions to legislate, or
require executive officers of local governments to perform specified
duties, by attaching stipulations to federal benefits." The Supreme
Court has placed four limitations on this authority. First, the stipula-
tion must serve the general welfare."0 Second, it must bear a relation
to the federal interest in the program."' Third, Congress must make
169 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
170 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (leaving Congress discretion to determine
what constitutes the "general welfare"); see aLvo Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)
(deferring to Congress's judgment in determining what means are "necessary and prop-
er" to promote the general welfare, and stating that "[w]hether the chosen means appear
'bad,' 'unwise,' or 'unworkable' to us is irrelevant").
171 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) ("[T]he Federal Government
may impose appropriate conditions on the use of federal property or privileges and may
require that state instrumentalities comply with conditions that are reasonably related to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs."); see also Ivanhoe Irriga-
tion Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) ("[T]he Federal Government may es-
tablish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project . ..
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the stipulation an explicit condition such that a state may receive the
benefit knowing that obligations come with it."' Fourth, the state
must also be at liberty to accept or decline the benefit."' The ques-
tion, then, is whether Congress may use bankruptcy courts to impose
resource adjustments or governance restructuring as a condition on
the benefit of gaining access to federal bankruptcy protections.
The Supreme Court's decision in National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sibelius, which struck down Congress's expansion of Med-
icaid, potentially impedes such intervention. The Medicaid expan-
sion provided states the choice of (1) increasing Medicaid eligibility
pursuant to federal regulations or (2) forfeiting federal aid that com-
pensated 50-83% of state Medicaid spending, which composed over
twenty percent of the average state budget.175 A state, by resisting the
Medicaid expansion, would face a loss exceeding 10% of its budget.""
Such penalty, Chief Justice John Roberts argued, left states with "no
real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion."1 7 7 States
must retain a "genuine choice" of accepting an offer.' 7
The issue, then, is whether a municipality facing insolvency may
voluntarily file under Chapter 9, thereby subjecting itself to federal
power to compel. As Gillette and Skeel point out, by incorporating
governance reform into Chapter 9 proceedings, courts could help
municipalities to effect politically unfavorable changes. Such reform
would be possible precisely because the urgency of resolving fiscal
distress may override dissent. '" Fiscal distress may prove so pressing
that a municipality has no other choice but to avail itself of federal
bankruptcy authority.
This does not appear to be a winning argument. If a bankruptcy
judge conditions Chapter 9 confirmation on acceptance of an affirm-
ative mandate, the municipality has a choice. It may accept the man-
date, or suffer fiscal distress without federal aid. A municipality, even
when facing crippling debt, has options that will allow it to weather a
debt crisis without the benefit of Chapter 9. Municipal
172 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
173 Id. ("The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power [] rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'").
174 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
175 See id. at 2606.
176 Id. at 2605.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 2608.
179 See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 106, at 36 ("Bankruptcy may thus create political openings
that did not previously exist.").
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decisionmakers may petition their state government for a bailout.8 o
Alternatively, they may intentionally default on obligations to resolve
a budget deficit.1' Because a Chapter 9 filing amounts to a voluntary
decision, affirmative conditions attached to the benefits of Chapter 9
182likely fall within the permissions of South Dakota v. Dole.
C. Comity and Abstention in Bankruptcy Courts
Resource adjustments, imposed in the form of a tax increase, im-
plicate the Supreme Court's broad concern for the autonomy of local
governments' powers of taxation. The Tax Injunction Act ("TIA")
reflects this principle. It provides that "[t]he district courts shall not
enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any
tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may
be had in the courts of such State." , 3  States receive protection far
broader than the TIA; rather than regarding it as a freestanding
piece of legislation, the Court regards the TIA as reflecting deeper
principles that federal courts must uphold. The law reflects, in Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas's words, "a partial codification of the federal
reluctance to interfere with state taxation."184  The Court's "strong
background presumption against interference with state taxation"
185stands to preserve the ability of states to raise their own revenue.
Yet, the Court in Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc. refused to extend its
jurisdiction to a complaint of discriminatory state taxation where the
plaintiff sought a remedy framed as a tax increase.' Such a remedy
would not impair state revenue collection; rather, it would increase
state income.
The Court, applying "comity doctrine," nonetheless decided that
federal courts must allow Ohio courts to determine how to remedy an
unequal tax. Comity, as a principle guiding federal equity jurisdic-
180 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 104-105. Before opting to file under Chapter 9,
the City of Stockton intentionally defaulted on bonds to cover a deficit.
181 See In re City of Stockton, Cal., 493 B.R 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) and supra text accom-
panying note 41.
182 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
183 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
184 See Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 590 (1995).
185 See id. at 586 ("It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means
to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them
that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as
possible.") (quoting Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. 108, 110 (1871)).
186 Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010). Note that plaintiff could not seek
an injunction to obtain tax relief; such a request would amount to restraint or suspension
of tax assessment that fell within the TIA's prohibition on federal jurisdiction. Id. at 429.
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tion, ensures that the federal government does not interfere in legit-
imate state activity in its effort to secure federal rights and interests.1
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote, a judicial intervention that al-
tered a tax code to ensure equal treatment would constitute "the very
interference in state taxation the comity doctrine aims to avoid.""
Federal courts must allow the state, through its courts or legislature,
to administer its tax laws.189
Comity doctrine raises a barrier on federal equity jurisdiction.'9 o It
is not clear what role this doctrine might play in a bankruptcy court.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334, federal district courts have original and ex-
clusive jurisdiction of all cases arising under Title 11, the federal
bankruptcy code."' The jurisdictional statute provides that "nothing
in [Section 1334] prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or
in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law,
from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding under title 11
or arising in or related to a case under title 11."'1 Congress therefore
left abstention within the bankruptcy court's power.
187 Id. at 431. See also Taylor v. Secor, 92 U.S. 575, 615 (1875) ("[T]he levy of taxes is not a
judicial function. Its exercise, by the constitutions of all the States, and by the theory of
our English origin, is exclusively legislative."). The Court in Taylor emphasized that in-
junctions against collection of state taxes should not issue without a "clear case" for equi-
table relief. Id. Municipal, county, and town taxation raised fewer concerns for the
Court, which noted that judicial control over political subdivisions, or "corporations,"
would not give rise to the "evils" that accompany jurisdiction over state revenue. Id. But
see Tomaiolo v. Transamerica Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 280, 291 (D.R.I. 2001), affd as modi-
fjed sub nom. Tomaiolo v. Mallinoff, 281 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that comity doc-
trine barred the court from granting injunctive relief against municipal taxation in action
under 42 U.S.C. 1983); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100
(1981) (denying relief because comity barred injunction impacting county taxation).
188 Levin, 560 U.S. at 429.
189 Id. See also Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 818 (1989) (awarding a tax re-
fund to plaintiff who suffered discriminatory taxation). The Davis court declined to
award injunctive relief barring future discriminatory taxation. Id. Relief would have con-
sisted of either (1) eliminating an exemption for retired state and local government em-
ployees or (2) extending the exemption to retired federal employees. The court found
Michigan courts better positioned to determine how best to achieve equal treatment. Id.
190 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (holding federal equity jurisdiction in a 42
U.S.C. 1983 action for injunctive relief improper when a state has initiated a criminal
prosecution). The Younger court explained that the "notion of 'comity'" provides a "vital"
underlying "reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prose-
cutions . . . ." Comity entails "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the
fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways."
Id.
191 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012).
192 11 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2012).
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Comity principles also raise non-jurisdictional barriers to federal
action.'" In Missouri v. Jenkins, a district court imposed a tax increase
on the Kansas City, Missouri, School District ("KCMSD") in 1987 to
ensure sufficient funding for a school desegregation plan.4 Specifi-
cally, the district court ordered the KCMSD to raise its property tax
levy from $2.05 to $4.00 for every $100 of a property's assessed val-
ue.'9 5  KCMSD appealed the order to the Supreme Court, which
struck down the tax increase for violating the "principles of comity"
that govern a federal court's "equitable discretion.""' In exercising
equitable power, Justice Byron White wrote, a court must respect the
"integrity and function" of local governments. The willingness of a
local government to remedy a violation of federal law pushed the
Court to regard the mandatory tax increase as exceedingly intru-
sive.' Additionally, the district court had less intrusive means availa-
ble for ensuring adequate funding.'9 As the court of appeals ob-
served, the district court could have "authorized or required KCMSD
to levy property taxes" and have "enjoined the operation of state laws
that would have prevented KCMSD from exercising this power.""
The district court's order violated principles of comity specifically
because it left no discretion to local institutions.200 In proceedings be-
low, the court of appeals held that the district court should "author-
ize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities."20
The Court upheld the court of appeals, distinguishing the proposed
requirement on its preservation of local government institutions. It
directed institutions to devise and implement a remedy rather than
prescribing the exact remedy.202 Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court
has upheld district court orders requiring local governments to issue
193 In National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582 (1995) and Ley-
in v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010), comity acted as a bar on federal jurisdic-
tion over plaintiffs' petition for relief. In Levin, the Court also noted that while amend-
ments to the TIA dropped language referring to the statute as "jurisdictional," the statute
remained jurisdictional. Levin, 560 U.S. at 429 n.10 (stating that while "[p]revious lan-
guage restricting the district courts' 'jurisdiction' was removed in the 1948 revision of Ti-
tle 28," the Court "continued to regard the Act asjurisdictional").
194 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 (1990).
195 Id. at 41-42.
196 Id. at 50.
197 Id. at 51.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 52 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) for the
proposition that courts must respect a local government's efforts to resolve constitutional
violations).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 51
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203tax increases in other desegregation cases. District courts retain
expansive power to compel governmental actors in desegregation
cases because the Tenth Amendment imposes no restraint on federal
authority. The Fourteenth Amendment curtails the power of states.
Bankruptcy courts cannot claim Fourteenth Amendment authori-
ty to justify derogation of municipal sovereignty. But bankruptcy
courts need not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment to claim such au-
thority. First, the Supreme Court, from the 1860s through the early
twentieth century, issued writs of mandamus to require that local of-
ficials levy taxes in fulfillment of debt obligations." Second, and
most importantly, as the following analysis proposes, principles of
federalism do not hold the same relationship with the Bankruptcy
Clause as they do with other positive allocations of authority the Con-
stitution lends to Congress. As the following analysis suggests, comity,
along with other forms of federalism, may have limited application to
municipal bankruptcy proceedings.
D. Theorizing a Bankruptcy Clause Carve-Out
Chapter 9's constitutional authority derives from the Bankruptcy
Clause of Article I, Section 8.' Contours of federalism have largely
formed in the context of legislation Congress enacted pursuant to its
spending power and authority to regulate commerce.2 6  Because the
Bankruptcy Clause creates distinct legislative authority, doctrines of
federalism do not necessarily apply with equivalent force in the con-
text of bankruptcy. In a recent pair of decisions, the Supreme Court
addressed the capacity of the Eleventh Amendment to immunize
203 See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnity., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (hold-
ing that the district court had authority to require local officials to "exercise the power
that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain with-
out racial discrimination a public school system in Prince Edward County like that oper-
ated in other counties in Virginia").
204 Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55-56 (citing cases); see also Bylinski v. City of Allen Park,
8 F. Supp. 2d 965, 970 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 169 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 1999) (ordering a
municipality to increase taxes to fund cleanup to remedy violations of the Environmental
Protection Act).
205 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing that Congress shall have Power to "establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States").
206 See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(Congress may not abrogate state immunity to private suit in their own courts through
legislation enacted pursuant to Article I); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress may not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity through legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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states from lawsuits arising out of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy proceedings.207 The Court's reasoning on the relationship be-
tween the bankruptcy code and the Eleventh Amendment suggests
that doctrines of federalism have limited scope as applied to Chapter
9.
In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Supreme Court
held that sovereign immunity posed no bar to a proceeding a bank-
2051ruptcy trustee brought against state agencies. Since the end of the
nineteenth century, the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amend-
ment to immunize states from actions seeking retrospective relief
brought by citizens of other states and their own citizens.0 In Katz,
the Court observed that
The history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the reasons it was insert-
ed in the Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and
enacted under its auspices immediately following ratification of
the Constitution demonstrate that it was intended not just as a
rant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize
limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bank-
210ruptcy arena.
The Court's reasoning rested on the power courts historically held
when adjudicating bankruptcies.
Before the American Revolution, and through the early nine-
teenth century, American colonies and states incarcerated debtors in
decrepitjails, called "debtors prisons." The practice served to express
moral condemnation of debtors." In 1800, Congress specifically au-
thorized federal courts to "issue a writ of habeas corpus to release a
debtor from state prison."21 2 Congress enacted the bankruptcy statute
in the midst of heated debate on the immunity of states following
Chisholm v. Georgia, which in 1793 held that federal courts had Article
III jurisdiction to hear suits brought by citizens against their own
states.213 The states ratified the Eleventh Amendment five years after
Chisolm. During this period, as state sovereignty was widely debated,
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. Despite authorizing
writs of habeas corpus compelling states to release debtors from state
207 Cent. Virginia Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v.
Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
208 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
209 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
210 Katz, 546 U.S. at 362-63.
211 Id. at 365-67; Brief for Bernard Katz as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5, Cent.
Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2005) (No. 04-885).
212 Katz, 546 U.S. at 374.
213 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793).
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prisons, legislative records revealed no concern that this power im-
properly subjected states to suit.2 11
For the Court, the Bankruptcy Act signaled an understanding that
the Bankruptcy Clause subordinated state sovereignty. By ratifying
the Bankruptcy Clause, states "acquiesced in a subordination of what-
ever sovereign immunity they might otherwise have asserted in pro-
ceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts."215 As the Court noted, "States agreed in the plan of
the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they
might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to 'Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies.' 21 1
Early bankruptcy proceedings, by authorizing writs of habeas cor-
pus ordering the release of debtors from prison, subordinated state
power. Federal courts received authority to compel state officials.
Significantly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 preceded the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence drawing distinctions between prospective and
retrospective relief.2" Abrogation of immunity thus implicated a
state's ability to be subject to injunctive relief, as well as liability for
damages or other forms of retrospective relief. While ratification of
the Bankruptcy Clause exposed states to proceedings requiring dis-
bursement to a creditor, it also restricted the scope of a state's im-
munity to jurisdiction to compel its officers.2 " Federal supremacy in-
terests may not justify federal intrusion into the essential functions of
states and their political subdivisions.'9 However, ratification of the
Bankruptcy Clause enabled this jurisdiction.
A theory of broad subordination hinges on two questions. First, it
depends on whether Katz has ramifications beyond the Eleventh
Amendment. Second, it depends on whether Katz applies to munici-
pal bankruptcy proceedings.
1. Katz Should Apply to Chapter 9 Proceedings
In adversarial proceedings arising from the City of San Bernardi-
no's bankruptcy, the State of California raised the question of wheth-
214 Katz, 546 U.S. at 374-75 (citing Hans, 134 U.S. 1).
215 Id. at 378.
216 Id. at 377.
217 SeeEx parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
218 See Katz, 546 U.S. at 378 n.14 ("The Ex parte Young doctrine was not finally settled until
over a century after the framing and the enactment of the first bankruptcy statute.").
219 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) ("Outside the strictures
of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments
and pursuing legislative objectives.").
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er Katz extends to municipal bankruptcy. On appeal from the
Bankruptcy Court's order sustaining the City's automatic stay against
state claims, the District Court for the Central District of California
endeavored to limit the reach of the Supreme Court's holding in
Katz. Most significantly, the Court held Katz inapplicable to Chapter
9 proceedings.2
The City of San Bernardino, after filing for bankruptcy in 2012,
entered proceedings to compel the State of California to transfer tax
revenue that it withheld.222 In 1945 the California legislature passed a
law creating Community Redevelopment Agencies ("CRAs"), which it
tasked with "remediat[ing] urban decay."2 2  In 1951, the legislature
authorized CRAs to use tax increment financing to fund redevelop-
ment plans, a practice through which the CRA received a portion of
property tax revenue that a designated district produces in excess of
an assessed base value.224 Before the City of San Bernardino entered
bankruptcy, the legislature passed a bill that dissolved California's
CRAs, which at the time received 12% of the state's property tax rev-
enue, and established agencies to "wind down" the CRAs' affairs.
226San Bernardino created a successor agency in 2012.
The bill that dissolved CRAs required the successor agencies to
remit CRA funds to the county auditor-controller. The City of San
Bernardino, however, attempted to use its Chapter 9 proceedings to
bar the State's claim to its CRA's funds.2 In 2013, the California De-
partment of Finance ("DOF") ordered the San Bernardino successor
agency to remit $15 million in transfers. In response, the City initiat-
ed proceedings based on its Chapter 9 filing to obstruct the State.
The City filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief establishing the
scope of its automatic stay as it applied to the withheld tax revenues,
as well as an injunction barring the State from withholding the tax-
228es.
The State argued in defense that the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments barred the City's claims.22 9 The bankruptcy court sided
220 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for background to the proceedings.
221 In re City of San Bernardino, No. 6:12-BK-28006-MJ, 2014 WL 2511096, at *13 (C.D. Cal.
June 4, 2014).
222 Id. at *1.
223 Cal. Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos, 267 P.3d 580, 590 (Cal. 2011).
224 Id. at 591.
225 In re Cily of San Bernardino, 2014 WL 2511096, at *1.
226 Id. at *2.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
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with the City.230 Citing Katz, Judge Meredith Jury reasoned the auto-
matic stay was appropriate because the Eleventh Amendment pre-
sented no bar to adversarial proceedings arising from the bankruptcy
filing.' On appeal, the District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia reversed the bankruptcy court's denial of the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity.232 The district court distinguished San Ber-
nardino's adversarial proceedings from Hood and Katz, which in-
volved private debtors, not a municipality.2" This difference mat-
tered, the court reasoned, because a municipal bankruptcy
implicated "a state's sovereignty and Tenth Amendment rights to a
greater degree than other bankruptcy contexts because of the special
relationship between a state and its municipalities. "'M
Additionally, the court adopted a narrow reading of Katz. Only
private debtors could file for bankruptcy when the Framers intro-
duced the Bankruptcy Clause to the Constitution.235 Because munici-
pal bankruptcy did not exist at the time of framing, with "no hint that
these proceedings would one day be available to municipalities," the
Framers "could not have contemplated the impact that waiving their
sovereign immunity would have" in the context of municipal bank-
ruptcy.3' The court conceded that, according to Katz, the Framers
contemplated the Bankruptcy Clause would subordinate state im-
munity under future bankruptcy laws that Congress enacts, not just
231
those that existed at the time of framing. Yet, municipal bankrupt-
cy threatened a "powerful interference with state sovereignty. , The
Supreme Court aimed to avoid interference in a state's control over
its fiscal affairs when it upheld the nation's first municipal bankruptcy
law in United States v. Bekins.2 39 The district court therefore declined
230 See Order Granting Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 8005 at 2, In re City of San Bernardino, No. 6:12-BK-28006-MJ
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013).
231 See Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Meredith Jury at 19-21, In re City of
San Bernardino, No. 6:12-BK-28006-MJ (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) ("[E]njoining
the State is an in persona[m] action, but it supports or protects the [res], which is the
property of the City, and therefore it is not all that different from the analysis that the
Supreme Court presented in the Katz case . . . .").
232 In re City of San Bernardino, No. 6:12-BK-28006-MJ, 2014 WL 2511096, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
June 4, 2014).
233 Id. at *12.
234 Id.
235 Id. at *13.
236 Id.
237 Id. at *13.
238 Id.
239 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938).
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to " [b] lindly extending the historical analysis applied in Katz" to mu-
* * *240nicipal proceedings.
The court distinguished the proceeding from that in Hood. San
Bernardino's property had a weaker "link" to the property disputed
in the adversarial proceedings.2 4' Hood and Katz, the court noted, in-
volved property over which bankruptcy courts exerted in rem juris-
diction.242 The disputed property in San Bernardino's proceedings
did not precisely belong to the City, but rather to its CRA successor
24agency. The City and the successor agency were not the same enti-
ty. The DOF's threat to withhold taxes from the successor agency did
not amount to a direct threat to the City's revenue.2 " The bankruptcy
court did not have exclusive in rem jurisdiction over the disputed
property.245 As the district court noted, the Supreme Court justified
abrogation of sovereign immunity in Hood based on the theory that a
bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction derived from the "debtor and
his estate," not from "his creditors."2" A bankruptcy court's discharge
order thus binds a state "no less than other creditors."24  Under the
reasoning of Hood, a strictly in rem proceeding did not implicate a
state's sovereign immunity.2" Because that was not the case in San
Bernardino's proceeding, the City's contention implicated the State's
claim to sovereign immunity.249
The district court failed to take seriously the City's arguments.
The City contended that, according to Katz, the Bankruptcy Clause
subordinated immunity in proceedings that are "'necessary to effec-
tuate the in remjurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.,250 The district
240 In re City of San Bernardino, 2014 WL 2511096, at *13.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at *14. Note that the district court upheld the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction over
the DOF's withholding of tax revenue from a non-debtor, the successor agency. The
court's jurisdiction extended to actions involving third parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) au-
thorizes "original but not exclusive jurisdiction" over all civil proceedings arising "in or
related to cases under title 11." Id. at *6. The DOF's proceeding against the successor
agency "could impact the administration of the City's bankruptcy." Id. at *7. The DOF's
proceedings against the successor agency would potentially damage the City by depriving
the successor agency of funds. Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at *14.
246 Id. at *13.
247 Id. (quoting Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004)).
248 Hood, 541 U.S. at 451..
249 In re City of San Bernardino, 2014 WL 2511096, at *14.
250 See Brief for Appellee at 10, In re City of San Bernardino, No. 6:12-BK-28006-MJ, 2014 WL
2511096, at *2 (Nov. 7, 2013) (quoting Cent. Virginia Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,
378 (2006)).
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court, in declining to extend Katz's historical theory to Chapter 9
proceedings, relied on cursory analysis of the unique ways municipal
bankruptcy shapes state fiscal management. The court argued that
unlike an individual, even one whose bankruptcy implicates property
interests of the state, a municipality retains no "privileges or immuni-
ties" that it may "invoke in opposition to the will of its creator," which
is the state.2 5' A state may withhold the municipality's powers as it
*252wishes.
The court, however, did not make clear why a municipality's lack
of privileges and immunities should render a municipal bankruptcy
any more intrusive than a private bankruptcy. First, a municipality
has no right to file under Chapter 9 without the state's consent.
Second, while a state's subdivision may have no rights apart from
those the state confers, the Supreme Court has sustained federal ju-
254
risdiction over conflicts between states and their instrumentalities.
When a state consents to allow a municipality to file under Chapter 9,
it confers on the municipality the rights and protections ensured un-
der the federal bankruptcy code.
2. Katz Has Implications Beyond the Eleventh Amendment
A broad reading of federal bankruptcy power remains susceptible
to two additional critiques. First, Katz addressed only the nature of a
state's sovereign immunity, not broader issues of federalism, especial-
ly as applied to local units of government. But the bankruptcy prac-
251 In re City of San Bernadino, 2014 WL 2511096, at *12 (quoting Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ.
Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 363 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40
(1933))).
252 Id. (quoting Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 362 (quoting Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187
(1923))).
253 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2) (providing that a municipality may qualify as a Chapter 9 debtor
only if it "is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a
debtor under [Chapter 9] by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization em-
powered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter").
254 SeeVa. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1640 (2011) ("[W]e do not
understand how a State's stature could be diminished to any greater degree when its own
agency polices its officers' compliance with their federal obligations, than when a private
person hales those officers into federal court for that same purpose-something everyone
agrees is proper.") (emphasis in original). In Stewart, the Supreme Court sustained juris-
diction over a state agency's uit against its state under Ex parte Young's exception to Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. The state agency, the Virginia Office for Protection and
Advocacy sued to enforce rights conferred through federal law. However, like a munici-
pality, VOPA was nonetheless a creature of the state. And like the right of action in Stew-
art, a municipal bankruptcy filing similarly rests on federal norms that the state, under 11
U.S.C. 109(c) (2), must have authorized the municipality to invoke.
255 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).
1302 [Vol. 18:4
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AND FEDERALISM
tices that the Court found encompassed within the Bankruptcy
Clause could compel local governments, as well as states. In the early
republic, state laws governed bankruptcy.'5" Yet, cities and counties
assumed responsibility for operating facilities that served as debtors'
prisons. Moreover, localities set the terms on which a debtor could
receive bail, as well as bail boundaries.5' Thus, a federal habeas ac-
tion would compel local as well as state officials. Additionally, a fed-
eral habeas action compels local officers. It may, for example, require
an officer to open a jail door to release a debtor, defying the state or
locality's will. This compelled action contravened principles secured
under the Tenth Amendment, or the Court's commandeering juris-
prudence, just as it implicates the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the
Court's analysis of the "plan of the convention" implicates principles
of federalism more broadly. It also modifies the structure of federal
power as it relates to local units of government.
Second, the Bankruptcy Clause arguably circumscribes sovereign
immunity only when a court's in rem jurisdiction implicates property
belonging to a state. This contention would suggest that the Bank-
ruptcy Clause should not impact the balance of federalism in other
settings. Katz rested on the theory that the Bankruptcy Clause subor-
dinated state immunity because its Framers contemplated federal ha-
beas corpus actions compelling state officials to release debtors from
prison.2" An individual's release from debtor's prison would be nec-
256 See, e.g., BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE 80 (2002) (describing colonial and state insolvency and bankruptcy stat-
utes as the "principal statutory mechanisms for freeing imprisoned debtors").
257 See id. at 86 (explaining that New York held its debtors in "the attic of city hall" prior to
1759). In Worcester, Massachusetts, the county government operated ajail that doubled
as a facility for holding debtors. Id. at 86. The County confined its debtors in a small,
fourteen-foot square room. Id. The County also assumed responsibility for developing a
new, larger facility after 1785. Id. Professor Mann also notes that, perhaps with the aim
of improving conditions in debtors' prisons, cities and counties expanded opportunities
available to debtors for receiving bail. Id. at 96. Some municipalities may also have al-
lowed release, subject to bail limits, without any posting of security, termed "mercy" re-
leases. Id. at 96 n.42.
258 Cent. Virginia Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 378 (2006). Note that some commenta-
tors have sharply criticized the Supreme Court's historical analysis, as well as its concep-
tion of in rem jurisdiction. Thomas E. Plank, State Sovereignty in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 59, 75-80 (2007) contends that that the Court's historical analy-
sis failed to demonstrate that the Bankruptcy Clause should receive different treatment
from other positive grants of authority to Congress. Professor Thomas Plank argues that
imprisonment for debt did not amount to a criminal proceeding for violation of state law,
and thus did not implicate a colony or state's immunity. Id. Professors Martin Reddish
and Daniel Greenfield criticize the Court for rending its decision based on "the result de-
sired" rather than "on a principled, consistently applied analysis of the Eleventh Amend-
ment... ." Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity and
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essary to effectuate a fresh start, a foundational objective of bank-
ruptcy law. Thus, the reasoning may go, the Bankruptcy Clause
should not alter the balance of federalism where the intervention
does not directly arise from jurisdiction over a disputed property in-
terest. It may not circumscribe constitutional doctrines that bar un-
due judicial intervention in municipal fiscal management or govern-
ance.
Yet, the Supreme Court established separate bases for recognizing
limitations to a state's sovereign immunity. The first draws from the
Court's conception of a bankruptcy court's exclusive in rem jurisdic-
tion, the second from its analysis of historical bankruptcy practices.5
First, Hood established that the discharge of a debt resulting from an
in rem proceeding does not infringe state sovereignty.' Hood in-
volved an insolvent student who sought the discharge of student
loans. Federal law provided that a student may not discharge loans
guaranteed by a governmental unit unless the bankruptcy court finds
that excepting the loans from its discharge order would cause "undue
hardship" to the student."' Hood filed a complaint seeking a deter-
mination of undue hardship and included the Tennessee Student As-
sistance Corporation ("TSAC"), a state entity that guarantees student
loans, as a defendant.262 TSAC moved to dismiss the complaint, con-
the Dilemma of Principled Decision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virginia Community Col-
lege v. Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 13, 19 (2007). They suspect that while Justice Ste-
vens aimed to use Katz to overturn Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (hold-
ing that the Indian Commerce Clause does not confer authority on Congress to abrogate
the States' sovereign immunity), he could not organize a majority around this proposi-
tion and instead employed inconsistent logic to restrict the application of Seminole Tribe to
the Bankruptcy Clause. Redish & Greenfield, supra note 258, at 17-19. Professor Ralph
Brubaker posits that the Court's analysis of the 1800 Act distorts "the historical pedigree
of the habeas corpus power vis-A-vis the immunity of the sovereign against suit." Ralph
Brubaker, Explaining Katz's New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign Immunity: The Bank-
rupcy Power As A Federal Forum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 95, 117 (2007). As Pro-
fessor Brubaker explains, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum allowed remedies against a King's
officers without the King's consent, thus suggesting that sovereign immunity did not im-
plicate such writs. Id.
Professor Susan Hauser notes that Katz presents an "easy target for criticism" and de-
fends the decision as resting on "strong and pragmatic principles." Susan E. Hauser, Nec-
essary Fictions: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction After Hood and Katz, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1181, 1233
(2008).
259 The District Court in In re City of San Bernardino recognized as much. See In re City of San
Bernardino, No. 6:12-BK-28006-MJ, 15, 16 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2014) ("Although the Su-
preme Court's historical analysis conducted in Katz is not applicable here, the Court's ex-
ercise of exclusive in remjurisdiction over the City's property may still preclude the State
Agencies' exercise of their sovereign immunity.")
260 Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446-51 (2004).
261 Id. at 444-45 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (exceptions to discharge)).
262 Id. at 443-45.
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tending that its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the action.
The Supreme Court rejected TSAC's argument. Through its exclu-
sive jurisdiction over a debtor's property, the Court held, a bankrupt-
cy court may extinguish debts without threatening state sovereignty.264
The Court's second, broader basis draws from Katz's historical in-
quiry. Katz addressed whether a debtor bookstore could institute
proceedings against Virginia institutions of higher education to
"avoid and recover" a "transfer of an interest of the debtor in proper-
ty.",6 The state entities sought dismissal based on sovereign immuni-
ty.2"6 The Court in Hood held that the bankruptcy court exercised in
rem jurisdiction in considering a request for a "hardship determina-
tion."26 ' The proceeding therefore did not implicate the state's sov-
ereign immunity; the Court had no need to resolve whether the
Bankruptcy Clause modified the scope of a state's sovereign immuni-
ty.2' While the proceeding in Hood was clearly ancillary to in rem ju-
risdiction," the Court in Katz decided that it had no need to "decide
whether actions to recover preferential transfers . . . are themselves
properly characterized as in rem.,27 As Justice John Paul Stevens ex-
plained, "some exercises of bankruptcy courts' powers-issuance of
writs of habeas corpus included-unquestionably involved more than
mere adjudication of rights in a res."2 1' The Bankruptcy Clause
bound states to subordinating sovereign immunity in "proceedings
necessary to effectuate the in rem adjudication of the bankruptcy
courts," regardless of whether a proceeding exceeds mere adjudica-
tion of in rem rights. 2
263 Id. at 445. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp.'s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at
10, Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) (explaining that adver-
sary proceedings against a state for determination of dischargeability amounts to a suit for
the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment).
264 Hood, 541 U.S. at 450-51.
265 Cent. Virginia Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 360 (2006). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (estab-
lishing conditions under which a trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property).
266 Katz, 546 U.S. at 361.
267 See Hood, 541 U.S. at 451 ("We find no authority ... that suggests a bankruptcy court's
exercise of its in remjurisdiction to discharge a student loan debt would infringe on state
sovereignty . . . .").
268 See id. at 445 (declining to reach the question of whether the Bankruptcy Clause granted
Congress authority to abrogate sovereign immunity).
269 See Katz, 546 U.S. at 371 (explaining that the proceeding in Hood was "merely ancillary to
the Bankruptcy Court's exercise of its in remjurisdiction").
270 Id. at 372.
271 Id. at 378.
272 Id. The Court noted that its analysis should not "suggest that every law labeled a 'bank-
ruptcy' law could, consistent with the Bankruptcy Clause, properly impinge upon state
sovereign immunity." Id. at 378 n.15. This caveat likely extends to elements of a bank-
ruptcy action that do not serve a bankruptcy court's jurisdictional needs. It also likely
Apr. 2016] 1305
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The viability of a broad subordination theory then turns on how
broadly a court may conceive of a "necessary" proceeding. A pro-
ceeding "necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts" 27 3 cannot only encompass practices that existed at the
time of the Constitution's ratification. Nor should it consist only of
proceedings that directly implicate a debtor's assets. For example, a
federal habeas corpus action to compel a debtor's discharge from
prison adjudicates the debtor's personal liberty, not the nature of any
entity's claim to his assets. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in-
cluded provisions that allowed federal authorities to seize the land of
a bankrupt debtor and sell it under federal law, defying state laws that
174
protected land against execution.27 The nature of a proceeding nec-
essary to bankruptcy jurisdiction may change as the economic, social,
and political fabric of society shifts. A proceeding becomes necessary
based on context. In a contemporary municipal bankruptcy, this
must encompass a bankruptcy court's authority over, and enforce-
ment of, a bankruptcy plan. In a municipal bankruptcy, a bankruptcy
court adjudicates creditors' rights as to the municipality's assets.
Modern bankruptcy courts need authority to reshape a municipality's
governance practices and budget structure. Such authority is neces-
sary to guard the interests of a municipality's residents and to protect
the rights of creditors, be they pensioners or bondholders. As the
Chapter 9 filings of general municipalities in recent years suggest,
municipal bankruptcy cannot serve its core purpose unless bankrupt-
cyjudges secure broader jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Clause may authorize federal intervention in the
core functions of local governments. The Supreme Court's decision
stands to guard against federal overreach, for example through Congress relying on ex-
pansive readings of Katz to artificially label a new, constitutionally shaky federal law a
"bankruptcy" law merely for the purposes of securing it against federalism challenges.
273 Katz, 546 U.S. at 378.
274 Brief of Historian Bruce H. Mann, Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23, Cent.
Virginia Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (No. 04-885). This contravention of
state law, which Thomas Jefferson objected to, did not arise from an adjudication of a
state's claim to assets. See id. (quoting Jefferson writing to John Francis Mercer that the
Bill "assumes the right of Seizing and selling lands, and so cuts the knotty question of the
Constitution whether the general government may direct the transmission of land by
discent [sic] or otherwise"). Rather, the Bill authorized contravention of state law itself,
not merely a state's immunity from suit. As Mann notes, no members of Congress raised
doubts as to Congress's authority to override state laws pertaining to seizure of land. Id.
at 24.
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in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz suggests that the imposi-
tion of resource adjustments or restructuring of governance practic-
es, which in other contexts would violate federalism principles, may
amount to a valid exercise of federal power in the context of a munic-
ipal bankruptcy. Furthermore, while the Constitution may tolerate
heightened federal authority under the Bankruptcy Clause, such use
of authority is also desirable. At the close of Detroit's bankruptcy
proceedings, as Judge Steven Rhodes reached the end of a two-hour
reading of his confirmation opinion, he stated: "Your enduring and
collective memory of what happened here, and your memory of your
anger about it, will be exactly what will prevent this from ever hap-
pening again."2% Detroit's exit from bankruptcy marked a staggering
achievement. Yet, memory alone will not heal a municipality like De-
troit.
After decades of accumulating pension liability, accompanied with
a declining population and tax base, Detroit fell into insolvency be-
cause the City entered transactions that used extensive borrowing to
cover pension costs.76 Under Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, the City in
2005 assumed $1.4 billion in debt to cover pensions liability, which
amounted to a fifth of Detroit's debt.'7 It marked a fatal step reflect-
ing the city's continued willingness to assume massive debt.2 7' The
City next purchased derivatives to secure a stable interest rate of 6%
on its pension debt. Soon after floating $250 million in "fiscal stabili-
zation bonds," Detroit's finance officer met with a Wall Street analyst
about plans to issue revenue bonds for the water department.279 The
officer's conversation reflected the city leadership's relaxed attitude
towards debt and its attendant risks. The analyst asked, "[W]hat
happens if Detroit goes bankrupt?"20 No such thing would happen,
the officer explained: "The state will step in and ensure that they
right the ship and that the bonds are paid."281
275 Nathan Bormey et al., How Detroit was Reborn: The Inside Story of Detroit's Historic Bankruptcy
Case, DETROIT FREE PRESS, http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-
bankruptcy/2014/ 11/09/detroit-bankruptcy-rosen-orr-snyder/18724267/.
276 Nathan Bormey and John Gallagher, How Detroit Went Broke: The Answers May Surprie You
- And Don't Blame Coleman Young, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 15, 2013)
http://archive.freep.com/interactive/article/20130915/NEWS01/130801004/Detroit-
Bankruptcy-history-1950-debt-pension-revenue.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id.
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Detroit emerged from bankruptcy with a manageable level of
debt. But like municipalities across the United States, Detroit will
continue to struggle to secure revenue sufficient to cover the cost of
daily operations, pensions, and redevelopment. The availability of
credit will tempt administrators to again take on debt. Detroit's
bankruptcy plan contains vague measures to allow for "financial over-
sight."2 2 But the plan has not cured deficiencies in urban govern-
ance that brought the City before Judge Steven Rhodes in 2013.
282 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 163 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) ("The plan also contem-
plates post-bankruptcy financial oversight of the City to ensure that the fiscal exigencies
that resulted in the City's chapter 9 bankruptcy never happen again.").
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